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FISCAL AUTONOMY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NIGERIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1       Background to the study

Nigeria is a federal state made up of three tiers of governments. Accordingly, the constitutional assignment of responsibilities to each of the tiers in both the exclusive and concurrent lists carries financial burden (Edame, 2004:249). Observably, due to the about eighty (80) per cent financial dependent nature of the federating units (states and local governments) on the federal government, those units become financially vulnerable, or what Edame calls “unviable political entities”. This problem is found to be more peculiar to local governments; and worsened by the unnecessary interferences or excessive control by the  state governments.

Notably, the control of local governments in Nigeria by national and state governments is not only as old as the system itself, it also borders most significantly on fiscal policies. For instance, during the colonial rule, local government control, done through the deconcentrated agents of regional governments -the Residents, left no room for the local populace to contribute anything except their dues and taxes into the coffers of the colonial masters (Awofeso, 2004:66). The native authorities (as local administration was then called) were at the mercy of the Residents- who made and implemented policies to suit the whims and caprices of their boss at the expense of the local people’s developmental well-being (Awofeso, 2004:127). In short, the idea of fiscal autonomy, or the likes, appeared unimaginable then.

However, with the assiduous and relentless struggle for political independence in the 1950s by the nationalists, local authorities (in the Eastern and Western part of Nigeria) enjoyed impressive and unprecedented political and fiscal autonomy. Interestingly, the present Ikot Ekpene Local Government in the study area, was used in the whole of West Africa as experimental ground to test its workability. Its success led to the Western part of Nigeria borrowing a leave in 1952 (Ibok and Tom, 2010:33). Regrettably, this arrangement was grossly abused by the managers in less than three (3) years and was accordingly withdrawn by the higher authorities (Awofeso, 2004:128-129). Since then, till date, further attempts to run this level of governance with fiscal autonomy for effective and efficient service delivery, have continued to produce same negative results.

For instance, with the military take-over in 1966, functions earlier performed by local authorities were taken over by higher authorities:  the local government police and prisons services were taken over by the federal government, while public water, primary and secondary education went to the states (Awofeso, 2004). Also, at the end of the civil war in 1970, state governments, in lieu of fiscal or financial autonomy to local governments, penetrated the grassroots through their deconcentrated agencies to render development oriented services and functions to the people (Awofeso, 2004). This system, to Ofoeze (1999), was not local government, as council officials did not emerge through election by the local populace, let alone fiscal autonomy.

However, following the 1976 local government reform, local government was once more accorded both political and financial recognition. Both the federal and state governments were by law required to allocate ten (10) per cent of the federation account and State Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) to local governments. To further strengthen both democratic and fiscal autonomy of local government, the federal government saw the need to increase its statutory allocation from ten (10) per cent to fifteen (15) per cent in 1989 and later to twenty (20) per cent in 1992. To this effect also was the policy of direct payment of the revenues into local governments accounts (Awofeso, 2004:98-99).

Unfortunately, and as in the early 1950s, corrupt practices of political leaders, this time at all levels in Nigeria became apparent, and local governance became the only “scape-goat” brought under absolute control by higher powers. Historical accounts also show that inspite of all the reforms, initiated policies and programmes of successive governments in Nigeria and Akwa Ibom State in particular, including that of Governor Akpabio’s predecessor, Governor Victor Attah, who assented the first local government law made by Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly in 2003 (Offiong 2006:46), local government challenges remain unresolved, much more compounded, and complex by the day. Local governments become platforms of abandoned projects, “money- sharing” or looting of public funds et cetera; and due to poor service delivery at this level, the bore-hole theory becomes prominent.

As a collaboration to the above view, Ibok and Tom (2010:84) posit that over the years, attempt by federal and state governments to float programmes using special agencies like River Basin Development Authority (RBDA), State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs), Akwa Ibom State Rural Water Project (AK-RUWATSON) and Akwa Ibom Investment Company (APIICO) just to mention but a few, without due respect for and or collaboration with local government, had almost always contributed to the failure of such programmes.

The authors also join other observers to decry the ambiguous or rather detrimental constitutional “role granted state government as arbitrators or umpires for local government in matters of statutory allocation such as: state – local government joint account empowerment of the Governor to dissolve crisis-ridden local council and also removal of erring chairman/councilors and appoint administrator or care-taker committee to pilot the affairs of such council”. Consequently, that provision during Governor Akpabio’s first tenure in office led to abrupt removal of the then chairman of Ikot Abasi local government area. At the same time, Akpabuyo local government council in Cross Rivers State stood dissolved (Ibok and Tom, 2010:87). The source, in conjunction with Osinachi (2003:180) also noted that section 7 (1) of the 1999 constitution which reads:

The system of local government by   democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed. And accordingly, the government of every state shall, subject to section 8 of this constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils (the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vol. 86, No.27, Lagos),

prompted Nasarawa and Lagos states to create new local government areas later refused recognition by the federal government. Other states which attempted creation of local government areas based on provisions of section 7 (2), 8 (3) (4) (5) and (6) of the same constitution were: Yobe, Ebonyi, Bayelsa, and Katsina (Offiong, 2006:46). In reaction, Lagos state challenged the refusal at the court to no avail.

Notably, most of the earlier mentioned programmes of higher authorities were single unit like agriculture, water or housing; but the Akpabio IMDLCC adopted near holistic or comprehensive approach for health, education, electricity water et cetrea at the same time. However, judging from increasing hunger, poverty, unemployment, decay of villages, towns and cities et cetera in Akwa Ibom State, Tamino, (2000:144 in Udoh, 2013), posits that instead of such seemingly wonderfully orchestrated policies serving as panacea for the perennial challenges at the local areas, it generates controversies calling for fiscal autonomy to the local governments to discharge its statutory functions efficiently as practised in other countries of the world; or the local government system be completely scrapped as it appears to be serving primarily political interest of few politicians to the detriment of the poor masses.

Worthy of mention at this point is the seeming contrary views of some authors who see the operational rules of the entire system of local government as being contrary to the spirit of democracy. Such scholars accuse local government of horizontal division as opposed to democracy where individuals are supposed to “have direct contact with the authorities rather than through intermediaries” (Awofeso, 2004:39-40). Whatever the case, the issue of direct contact with the authority here best suits fiscal autonomy for governance at the grassroots than any other level of authority.

It is therefore the intention of this researcher to expand the frontiers of knowledge by inter-alia investigating the extent to which the tool of fiscal autonomy on Nigerian local governments could serve as the best means of rendering to the rural people the needed proficient service delivery for the populace in Nigeria generally, and Akwa Ibom State in particular.

In the same vein, the researcher will examine some of the key factors responsible for repeated abuses of local government fiscal autonomy in Akwa Ibom State in particular and Nigeria in general, and with a view to proffering possible solution.

1.2       Statement of the Problem

Fiscal autonomy in local governments is generally believed to be the best tool for effective and efficient service delivery in rural areas of federated countries like Nigeria. In other words, with adequate funding, due process and accountability (devoid of excessive control by higher authorities – federal and or state government), local governments stand to serve best in the provision of basic social amenities like portable water, electricity, education, health-care service, recreational facilities to their respective communities. By so doing, the system could have inter-alia prevented rural-urban migration and its attendant socio-economic, political and environmental ills.

However, due to some known and unknown factors which this research is set to confirm and or discover, the system appears to have become a mirage. The situation seems so bad that the more the higher authorities try to intervene through reforms and programmes, the more such attempts attract public suspicion and condemnation. A typical example is the all-time-many projects executed by the immediate past administration of Governor Godswill Obot Akpabio across the thirty-one (31) local government areas of the state through the Inter-Ministerial Direct Labour Coordinating Committee (IMDLCC). Contrary to the expected, most authors, analysts, and indeed, members of the Akwa Ibom general public seem to perceive the mentioned programme as not only a ploy to continually deny this level of governance its statutory fiscal autonomy, but also as safe haven for misappropriation of public funds and strengthening of political patronage base, to the detriment of the poor rural masses.

Accordingly, available sources also reveal that Akwa Ibom State, under this circumstance in 2010, had the third highest poverty rate of 27.1 per cent in the South south zones; 63 per cent of the entire population considered ‘poor’ with 53.6 per cent in US$1 a day; second highest unemployment state in the zones with 25.8 per cent; continuous increase in unemployment rate (from 18.2 per cent in 2005 to 18.4 per cent in 2011), especially amongst the vulnerable groups like Youths, Women, Handicapped persons, Aged persons and Orphans); prevalence of HIV/AIDS (from 8.0 per cent in 2005 to 10.9 per cent in 2011)

. gov.ng,20/11/12 in Udoh (2013).

In the same vein, scholars further raise the curiosity of stakeholders by positing that, due to lack of due process and accountability, mere spending of annual budget on infrastructure as done in Akwa Ibom State by Akpabio administration (80 per cent, far above the internationally recommended 70 per cent minimum for capital development) in lieu of local governments’ fiscal autonomy, has not always contributed to much service delivery that is of benefit to the poor (Jerome, 2006:16, Eminue, 2009:311). To this end, Mahajan (2006:599) posits that:

We cannot realize the full benefit of democratic government unless we begin by the admission that all problems are not central problems and that the results of problems not central in their incidence require decision at the place and by the persons where and by whom the incidence is most deeply felt.

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the aforementioned postulations depict intuition and figments of political imagination without any known empirical investigation to further substantiate those claims, there are apparent dissatisfaction, differences, doubts, claims and counter claims with attendant adverse effect on the citizens on one hand, and the government of Akwa Ibom State on the other; hence the apparent need for this research.

1.3       Research Question

The following research questions shall guide this study.

What is the effect of lack of fiscal autonomy on service delivery in the local governments of Akwa Ibom State and Nigeria? To what extent is poor service delivery in rural areas of the state, directly related to insufficient funding? To what extent is state excessive control of local governments’ finances an impediment to effective and efficient service delivery in the rural areas of Akwa Ibom State? What is the quality of present local governments in the state based on service delivery? What are the factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State? How different was service delivery of fiscal autonomy situation of 1987-1993 from the non-fiscal autonomy situations of 2007-2015? How could challenges of fiscal autonomy be resolved to meet service delivery needs efficiently in the local government areas of the state?

1.4.      Objectives of the Study

(i)      Main Objective

To find out why most local governments in Nigeria in general and Akwa Ibom State in particular are unable to acquire fiscal autonomy with a view to highlighting problem for possible solution.

(ii)      Specific Objectives

To assess the extent to which lack of fiscal autonomy affects service delivery in rural areas of Akwa Ibom State. To examine the extent to which poor service delivery in rural areas is directly related to insufficient funding. To examine the extent to which State excessive control of local governments hampers service delivery in the rural areas of the State. To determine the extent to which quality of local governments is finance/infrastructure base. To identify and compare possible factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments in the state. To describe the extent to which service delivery of 1987-1993 was different from that of 2007-2015. To proffer solution to challenges of the subject matter by way of recommendations

1.5       Hypotheses

Ho: Lack of fiscal autonomy tends not to affect service delivery in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

            H1: Lack of fiscal autonomy tends to affect service delivery in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

Ho: Poor service delivery is not directly related to insufficient funds in local governments of the State.

H1: Poor service delivery is directly related to insufficient funds in local governments of the State.

Ho: State excessive control of local governments’ finances tends not to bring about a slow pace of service delivery in rural areas of the state.

H1: State excessive control of local governments’ finances tends to bring about a slow pace of service delivery in rural areas of the state

Ho: Quality of present local governments in the state appears not to be service delivery base.

H1: Quality of present local governments in the state appears to be service delivery base.

Ho: There are no known factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

H1: There are known factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

1.6       Significance of the Study

The overall significance of this study to Akwa Ibom people and the larger society lies in its chances of proffering enduring solution to the age-long controversies surrounding actions and or inactions of higher authorities vis-à-vis local governance. This stands to be possible as the study will expose hidden agenda of government and constraints that preclude the functionality of government(s) for the general good of all the stakeholders. It will enable the promulgation of necessary law to checkmate the excesses of leaders and enhance a robust democratic relationship between and amongst stakeholders.

Finally, this study could assist as blueprint and strategy of policy formulation and implementation to governments, academics, analysts as it will check a dearth of literature and stimulate further studies on the subject matter or its related areas.

1.7       Scope of the Study

The scope of this research is limited to the Fiscal Autonomy and Service Delivery in Nigerian Local Governments: A case study of Akwa Ibom State Local Governments between 2007 and 2015.

1.8       Limitation of the Study

Among the experienced limitations in the process of this master-piece were: lack of sufficient fund to foot the bill for data collection and other logistics; time constraint; poor hand-writing of respondents; uncooperative disposition of respondents, especially top management officials in government, and also the general apathy of members of the public toward researchers. However, with the assistance of well trained and informed field workers (mostly Akwa Ibom State indigenes), the attendant difficulties were surmounted.

1.9       Organization of the Study

This research is a five chapter piece as follows: Chapter one covers all the preliminary expositions such as the Background of the Study; Statement of  the Research Problem; Objectives of the Study; Hypotheses; Scope of the Study; Limitation of the Study; Organization of the Study; and the Last but the least, Operationalization of Concepts. Chapter two covers the Review of Related Literature, and Theoretical Framework. Chapter three discusses the methodology  of the study as follows: Area of the study; Research Techniques; Instrumentation; Validation of the Instrument; Reliability of the Instrument; Administration of the Instrument; and Statistical Treatment of Data. Chapter four deal with data presentation; Analysis and Discussion of Findings. Finally, Chapter five presents the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.

1.10     Operationalization of Concepts

The following concepts have been operationalised as used in this study for the purpose of clarity

Accountability: It is the periodic, comprehensive, and justifiable report of government on its stewardship to the governed. In other words, until the accounting officer is duly punished to serve as deterrent to others if found fraudulent or commended if otherwise, accountability is not complete. Administration: This refers to the government or leadership of a country or state like Nigeria or Akwa Ibom State at a particular time. Hence, the Akpabio administration referring to the state government he led between 2007 and 2015. Autonomy and Control: Here, the above desirable state of the government is in a continuum for necessary identification thus: the lesser the control by higher authority(ies), the greater the autonomy and vice-versa. In other words, since it is not possible to think of an absolute local government autonomy within a territory of a sovereign, the research would rather emphasize and concentrate on the extent to which autonomy and control could be reasonably and consciously handled by the first two tiers of government to successfully complement the administration of the “third tier”. Corruption: It could be described as acts of bribery, embezzlement, abuse of office et cetera. Hence, the act promotes poor, over-bloated contracts and haphazared service delivery. Development: This has to do with availability of social amenities like good roads, adequate food, health services, education, housing, water, high per capita income, freedom to participate effectively in the political and spiritual life (governance) of the community toward economic sustainability et cetera. Due Process: With this, policy programme of budget monitoring and price intelligence unit are strategized to checkmate wastages, corruption et cetera and encourage transparency, competency, and the likes in the appropriation of public matters or concerns. Fiscal Autonomy: This is a state of making local governance to have not only distinct territorial boundary, legal powers to do or achieve specific goal but also, most importantly, enjoy substantial autonomy in financial matters without excessive but complementary control by higher authority(ies). These include, owning of treasury, separate budgets, and accounts based on effective reliable income generation from within and outside its domain. Fiscal Federalism: It is the allocation of financial powers and expenditure responsibilities to different levels of government in a federation. Infrastructure: Here, infrastructure could be described as embracing all public services, from law and order through education and public health to transportation, communication, power and water supply as well as such agricultural overheads in irrigation, drainage systems et cetera. Infrastructural development: It is the process of putting in place those soft and hard socio-economic elements as in infrastructure above with a view to enhancing better quality living of the masses; particularly, when the provision reduces poverty through increase in employment opportunities. It is synonymous with national development. Inter-Ministerial Direct Labour: This has to do with ministries, parastatals, and the various government agencies that are directly connected to the development of rural communities in Akwa Ibom State viz: Ministries of Rural Development, Health, Finance, Education and that of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. This agency, fully called Inter-Ministerial Direct Labour Coordinating Committee (IMDLCC) was inaugurated by Governor Godswill Obot Akpabio (the current senator representing Ikot Ekpene Senatorial District of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria and Minority leader in the Red Chamber) in 2007 to impact directly, positively and effectively the lives of Akwa Ibom State people in the rural areas particularly. Local Government: This is the third tiers of government at the local or grassroot level. It is established by law to exercise specific functions within specific areas. It is a territorial community with non-sovereign power to regulate its own affairs. Service Delivery: This has to do with the process of providing basic amenities as in infrastructure and infrastructural development above.

REFERENCES

Awofeso, O. (2004). Issues in Local Government Administration in Nigeria. Lagos: Lisjohnson Resources Publishers, pp. 39-41, 44, 66, 77, 98-99,126-137, 143, 144, 149.Edame, E. (2004). The Essentials of Public Finance and Public Finance Management in Nigeria (2nd Edition). Calabar: University of Calabar Press, pp. 87-90, 249.

CHAPTER ONE

 

 

INTRODUCTION

1.1       Background to the study

Nigeria is a federal state made up of three tiers of governments. Accordingly, the constitutional assignment of responsibilities to each of the tiers in both the exclusive and concurrent lists carries financial burden (Edame, 2004:249). Observably, due to the about eighty (80) per cent financial dependent nature of the federating units (states and local governments) on the federal government, those units become financially vulnerable, or what Edame calls “unviable political entities”. This problem is found to be more peculiar to local governments; and worsened by the unnecessary interferences or excessive control by the  state governments.

Notably, the control of local governments in Nigeria by national and state governments is not only as old as the system itself, it also borders most significantly on fiscal policies. For instance, during the colonial rule, local government control, done through the deconcentrated agents of regional governments -the Residents, left no room for the local populace to contribute anything except their dues and taxes into the coffers of the colonial masters (Awofeso, 2004:66). The native authorities (as local administration was then called) were at the mercy of the Residents- who made and implemented policies to suit the whims and caprices of their boss at the expense of the local people’s developmental well-being (Awofeso, 2004:127). In short, the idea of fiscal autonomy, or the likes, appeared unimaginable then.

However, with the assiduous and relentless struggle for political independence in the 1950s by the nationalists, local authorities (in the Eastern and Western part of Nigeria) enjoyed impressive and unprecedented political and fiscal autonomy. Interestingly, the present Ikot Ekpene Local Government in the study area, was used in the whole of West Africa as experimental ground to test its workability. Its success led to the Western part of Nigeria borrowing a leave in 1952 (Ibok and Tom, 2010:33). Regrettably, this arrangement was grossly abused by the managers in less than three (3) years and was accordingly withdrawn by the higher authorities (Awofeso, 2004:128-129). Since then, till date, further attempts to run this level of governance with fiscal autonomy for effective and efficient service delivery, have continued to produce same negative results.

For instance, with the military take-over in 1966, functions earlier performed by local authorities were taken over by higher authorities:  the local government police and prisons services were taken over by the federal government, while public water, primary and secondary education went to the states (Awofeso, 2004). Also, at the end of the civil war in 1970, state governments, in lieu of fiscal or financial autonomy to local governments, penetrated the grassroots through their deconcentrated agencies to render development oriented services and functions to the people (Awofeso, 2004). This system, to Ofoeze (1999), was not local government, as council officials did not emerge through election by the local populace, let alone fiscal autonomy.

However, following the 1976 local government reform, local government was once more accorded both political and financial recognition. Both the federal and state governments were by law required to allocate ten (10) per cent of the federation account and State Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) to local governments. To further strengthen both democratic and fiscal autonomy of local government, the federal government saw the need to increase its statutory allocation from ten (10) per cent to fifteen (15) per cent in 1989 and later to twenty (20) per cent in 1992. To this effect also was the policy of direct payment of the revenues into local governments accounts (Awofeso, 2004:98-99).

Unfortunately, and as in the early 1950s, corrupt practices of political leaders, this time at all levels in Nigeria became apparent, and local governance became the only “scape-goat” brought under absolute control by higher powers. Historical accounts also show that inspite of all the reforms, initiated policies and programmes of successive governments in Nigeria and Akwa Ibom State in particular, including that of Governor Akpabio’s predecessor, Governor Victor Attah, who assented the first local government law made by Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly in 2003 (Offiong 2006:46), local government challenges remain unresolved, much more compounded, and complex by the day. Local governments become platforms of abandoned projects, “money- sharing” or looting of public funds et cetera; and due to poor service delivery at this level, the bore-hole theory becomes prominent.

As a collaboration to the above view, Ibok and Tom (2010:84) posit that over the years, attempt by federal and state governments to float programmes using special agencies like River Basin Development Authority (RBDA), State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs), Akwa Ibom State Rural Water Project (AK-RUWATSON) and Akwa Ibom Investment Company (APIICO) just to mention but a few, without due respect for and or collaboration with local government, had almost always contributed to the failure of such programmes.

The authors also join other observers to decry the ambiguous or rather detrimental constitutional “role granted state government as arbitrators or umpires for local government in matters of statutory allocation such as: state – local government joint account empowerment of the Governor to dissolve crisis-ridden local council and also removal of erring chairman/councilors and appoint administrator or care-taker committee to pilot the affairs of such council”. Consequently, that provision during Governor Akpabio’s first tenure in office led to abrupt removal of the then chairman of Ikot Abasi local government area. At the same time, Akpabuyo local government council in Cross Rivers State stood dissolved (Ibok and Tom, 2010:87). The source, in conjunction with Osinachi (2003:180) also noted that section 7 (1) of the 1999 constitution which reads:

The system of local government by   democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed. And accordingly, the government of every state shall, subject to section 8 of this constitution, ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils (the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Vol. 86, No.27, Lagos),

prompted Nasarawa and Lagos states to create new local government areas later refused recognition by the federal government. Other states which attempted creation of local government areas based on provisions of section 7 (2), 8 (3) (4) (5) and (6) of the same constitution were: Yobe, Ebonyi, Bayelsa, and Katsina (Offiong, 2006:46). In reaction, Lagos state challenged the refusal at the court to no avail.

Notably, most of the earlier mentioned programmes of higher authorities were single unit like agriculture, water or housing; but the Akpabio IMDLCC adopted near holistic or comprehensive approach for health, education, electricity water et cetrea at the same time. However, judging from increasing hunger, poverty, unemployment, decay of villages, towns and cities et cetera in Akwa Ibom State, Tamino, (2000:144 in Udoh, 2013), posits that instead of such seemingly wonderfully orchestrated policies serving as panacea for the perennial challenges at the local areas, it generates controversies calling for fiscal autonomy to the local governments to discharge its statutory functions efficiently as practised in other countries of the world; or the local government system be completely scrapped as it appears to be serving primarily political interest of few politicians to the detriment of the poor masses.

Worthy of mention at this point is the seeming contrary views of some authors who see the operational rules of the entire system of local government as being contrary to the spirit of democracy. Such scholars accuse local government of horizontal division as opposed to democracy where individuals are supposed to “have direct contact with the authorities rather than through intermediaries” (Awofeso, 2004:39-40). Whatever the case, the issue of direct contact with the authority here best suits fiscal autonomy for governance at the grassroots than any other level of authority.

It is therefore the intention of this researcher to expand the frontiers of knowledge by inter-alia investigating the extent to which the tool of fiscal autonomy on Nigerian local governments could serve as the best means of rendering to the rural people the needed proficient service delivery for the populace in Nigeria generally, and Akwa Ibom State in particular.

In the same vein, the researcher will examine some of the key factors responsible for repeated abuses of local government fiscal autonomy in Akwa Ibom State in particular and Nigeria in general, and with a view to proffering possible solution.

1.2       Statement of the Problem

Fiscal autonomy in local governments is generally believed to be the best tool for effective and efficient service delivery in rural areas of federated countries like Nigeria. In other words, with adequate funding, due process and accountability (devoid of excessive control by higher authorities – federal and or state government), local governments stand to serve best in the provision of basic social amenities like portable water, electricity, education, health-care service, recreational facilities to their respective communities. By so doing, the system could have inter-alia prevented rural-urban migration and its attendant socio-economic, political and environmental ills.

However, due to some known and unknown factors which this research is set to confirm and or discover, the system appears to have become a mirage. The situation seems so bad that the more the higher authorities try to intervene through reforms and programmes, the more such attempts attract public suspicion and condemnation. A typical example is the all-time-many projects executed by the immediate past administration of Governor Godswill Obot Akpabio across the thirty-one (31) local government areas of the state through the Inter-Ministerial Direct Labour Coordinating Committee (IMDLCC). Contrary to the expected, most authors, analysts, and indeed, members of the Akwa Ibom general public seem to perceive the mentioned programme as not only a ploy to continually deny this level of governance its statutory fiscal autonomy, but also as safe haven for misappropriation of public funds and strengthening of political patronage base, to the detriment of the poor rural masses.

Accordingly, available sources also reveal that Akwa Ibom State, under this circumstance in 2010, had the third highest poverty rate of 27.1 per cent in the South south zones; 63 per cent of the entire population considered ‘poor’ with 53.6 per cent in US$1 a day; second highest unemployment state in the zones with 25.8 per cent; continuous increase in unemployment rate (from 18.2 per cent in 2005 to 18.4 per cent in 2011), especially amongst the vulnerable groups like Youths, Women, Handicapped persons, Aged persons and Orphans); prevalence of HIV/AIDS (from 8.0 per cent in 2005 to 10.9 per cent in 2011)

. gov.ng,20/11/12 in Udoh (2013).

In the same vein, scholars further raise the curiosity of stakeholders by positing that, due to lack of due process and accountability, mere spending of annual budget on infrastructure as done in Akwa Ibom State by Akpabio administration (80 per cent, far above the internationally recommended 70 per cent minimum for capital development) in lieu of local governments’ fiscal autonomy, has not always contributed to much service delivery that is of benefit to the poor (Jerome, 2006:16, Eminue, 2009:311). To this end, Mahajan (2006:599) posits that:

We cannot realize the full benefit of democratic government unless we begin by the admission that all problems are not central problems and that the results of problems not central in their incidence require decision at the place and by the persons where and by whom the incidence is most deeply felt.

Notwithstanding the fact that most of the aforementioned postulations depict intuition and figments of political imagination without any known empirical investigation to further substantiate those claims, there are apparent dissatisfaction, differences, doubts, claims and counter claims with attendant adverse effect on the citizens on one hand, and the government of Akwa Ibom State on the other; hence the apparent need for this research.

1.3       Research Question

The following research questions shall guide this study.

What is the effect of lack of fiscal autonomy on service delivery in the local governments of Akwa Ibom State and Nigeria? To what extent is poor service delivery in rural areas of the state, directly related to insufficient funding? To what extent is state excessive control of local governments’ finances an impediment to effective and efficient service delivery in the rural areas of Akwa Ibom State? What is the quality of present local governments in the state based on service delivery? What are the factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State? How different was service delivery of fiscal autonomy situation of 1987-1993 from the non-fiscal autonomy situations of 2007-2015? How could challenges of fiscal autonomy be resolved to meet service delivery needs efficiently in the local government areas of the state?

1.4.      Objectives of the Study

(i)      Main Objective

To find out why most local governments in Nigeria in general and Akwa Ibom State in particular are unable to acquire fiscal autonomy with a view to highlighting problem for possible solution.

(ii)      Specific Objectives

To assess the extent to which lack of fiscal autonomy affects service delivery in rural areas of Akwa Ibom State. To examine the extent to which poor service delivery in rural areas is directly related to insufficient funding. To examine the extent to which State excessive control of local governments hampers service delivery in the rural areas of the State. To determine the extent to which quality of local governments is finance/infrastructure base. To identify and compare possible factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments in the state. To describe the extent to which service delivery of 1987-1993 was different from that of 2007-2015. To proffer solution to challenges of the subject matter by way of recommendations

1.5       Hypotheses

Ho: Lack of fiscal autonomy tends not to affect service delivery in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

            H1: Lack of fiscal autonomy tends to affect service delivery in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

Ho: Poor service delivery is not directly related to insufficient funds in local governments of the State.

H1: Poor service delivery is directly related to insufficient funds in local governments of the State.

Ho: State excessive control of local governments’ finances tends not to bring about a slow pace of service delivery in rural areas of the state.

H1: State excessive control of local governments’ finances tends to bring about a slow pace of service delivery in rural areas of the state

Ho: Quality of present local governments in the state appears not to be service delivery base.

H1: Quality of present local governments in the state appears to be service delivery base.

Ho: There are no known factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

H1: There are known factors influencing fiscal autonomy in local governments of Akwa Ibom State.

1.6       Significance of the Study

The overall significance of this study to Akwa Ibom people and the larger society lies in its chances of proffering enduring solution to the age-long controversies surrounding actions and or inactions of higher authorities vis-à-vis local governance. This stands to be possible as the study will expose hidden agenda of government and constraints that preclude the functionality of government(s) for the general good of all the stakeholders. It will enable the promulgation of necessary law to checkmate the excesses of leaders and enhance a robust democratic relationship between and amongst stakeholders.

Finally, this study could assist as blueprint and strategy of policy formulation and implementation to governments, academics, analysts as it will check a dearth of literature and stimulate further studies on the subject matter or its related areas.

1.7       Scope of the Study

The scope of this research is limited to the Fiscal Autonomy and Service Delivery in Nigerian Local Governments: A case study of Akwa Ibom State Local Governments between 2007 and 2015.

1.8       Limitation of the Study

Among the experienced limitations in the process of this master-piece were: lack of sufficient fund to foot the bill for data collection and other logistics; time constraint; poor hand-writing of respondents; uncooperative disposition of respondents, especially top management officials in government, and also the general apathy of members of the public toward researchers. However, with the assistance of well trained and informed field workers (mostly Akwa Ibom State indigenes), the attendant difficulties were surmounted.

1.9       Organization of the Study

This research is a five chapter piece as follows: Chapter one covers all the preliminary expositions such as the Backgr

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